On the 1947 Soviet Vote in the UN regarding Palestine’s Partition

This article is the second in a three‐​part series on the background to the Soviet Union’s vote on the partition of Palestine. It covers the history of the Soviet vote in the UN. The first part deals with the relationship between the British Empire and the Zionist movement. Part three treats the Soviet and Middle Eastern opposition to the Bernadotte Plan.

Introduction: In the 1940s, the British Empire and the Zionist mainstream posed »no longer« as allies but as vehement »foes.« Behind the scenes, however, British imperialism continued its alliance with the Zionist leadership. The presence of the British military in Palestine served as reinforcements to the MI6 agent Ben‐​Gurion and his hangmen in the Haganah army leadership. It thus follows that the removal of the British troops from Palestine was the removal of the reinforcements to the Haganah, thereupon weakening the Israeli military force responsible for the Nakba. The Nakba came not greatly much due to the partition and demarcations made on the map but many times more so due to the immense military strength of the Hebrew and Arab reaction, the Haganah‐​Irgun forces in Israel and the Mufti’s Arab SS troops in Palestine — the removal of the British reinforcers of the reactionary armed forces was most righteously prioritized by the socialist forces.

In the UN, along with struggling for the removal of the British imperialists from Palestine, the USSR also pushed for the non‐​partition and sought to ensure a territorially‐​integral bi‐​ethnic democratic state of Palestine in which Israelis and Arabs could have equal rights. Under the influence of American imperialists, the Soviet proposal for the bi‐​ethnic statehood and territorial integrity of Palestine was turned down and the UN resolution put forward tied as a »package deal« the removal of the British troops to the partition of Palestine. Rightly prioritizing the removal of the British reinforcers of the Haganah, and hence rightly prioritizing the weakening of Ben-Gurion’s army even at the cost of official partition of Palestine, the USSR voted for this resolution. Subsequently, US intelligence confirmed, USSR made no steps for enforcing the partition‐​related excerpts of the UN resolution but every step for enforcing the excerpts concerning the removal of UK troops.

In 1946, the USSR signed a secret treaty with Syria calling for the removal of British troops from the region:

»The USSR agree to support the Syrian government in all steps which the latter may undertake in order to establish complete independence. The USSR will back Syrian demands for immediate evacuation of all French and British troops.«¹

The same type of deal was made with Lebanon:

»A secret treaty between the USSR and the Lebanese government based on these [above] clauses, was signed two days later.«²

The first significant political dialogue between the Soviet Union and the Arab governments occurred at the beginning of 1946. In an attempt to increase their influence in the Middle East, the USSR approached the President of Lebanon, Bishara al‐​Khuri, on 10 January 1946 with a proposal to negotiate a secret treaty. After consultations and discussions between the Lebanese and Syrian governments, both agreed to receive the first formal proposal of a treaty from the USSR.«³

Therefore, the USSR had an international obligation to strive towards the reduction of British imperial influence in the Levant — and the Soviets stayed true to their words. As the world’s superpower, the USSR took the initiative in the UN by starting the discussions on the independence of Palestine, a topic which the Anglo‐​Americans surely sought to avoid:

»The efforts of the United Kingdom and United States to avoid discussion of the substance of the Palestine problem at the special session, and to create a neutral committee without Great Power participation, provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to gain credit for a certain degree of leadership in the Palestine question. Gromyko exploited this opportunity by (1) appearing to champion the principle of full discussion; (2) generally favoring immediate independence and termination of the Mandate… The course pursued by the Soviets appears to leave the USSR in an excellent tactical position for the future.«⁴

In early 1947, thanks to the efforts of Palmachnik Israeli freedom‐​fighters and the pro‐​Soviet faction of the Lehi, the question on the fate of Palestine was brought forth to the United Nations:

»in February 1947 … the British Government, under the pressure of violence in Palestine, requested a special session of the General Assembly to consider the appointment of a special committee ›to make recommendations … concerning the future government of Palestine‹.«⁵

The official goal of the UNSCOP was to: »prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine.«⁶

However, the UNSCOP member states were: »Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.«⁷

Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia were all firmly entrenched in the imperialist camp. The latter in particular is noteworthy as will be seen later in this chapter. In spite of its ›anti‐​imperialist‹ pretensions, Yugoslavia was a comprador state, allied to Anglo‐​American and German finance capital, and thus serving as one of the hubs of CIA‐​Mossad and MI6.

India was openly sympathetic to the USSR.

The situation in Czechoslovakia was mixed. The influence of the communist and anti‐​communist forces in Czechoslovakia was quasi‐​equal in 1947. Note that Czechoslovakia’s communist revolution did not happen until 1948. Nor did the Red Army have a strong presence in Czechoslovakia to create the pressure for non‐​socialist Czechoslovakia to adopt Soviet lines. While the Communist Party (KSČ) maintained a strong popular representation in the Czechoslovak government, they still were not yet in power. As a matter of fact, Czechoslovakia was back then led by such openly pro‐​Western capitalist leaders as President Edvard Benes and the pro‐​Western ›Christian Zionist‹ Foreign Minister and millionaire Jan Masaryk. Subordinated to Masaryk was his Under Secretary, Vladimir Clementis who was ostensibly a ›communist‹ and officially belonged to the KSČ, but, as a member of a ring of Anglo‐​American agents, was secretly betraying Czechoslovakia by promoting Slovak separatism and anti‐​state Zionist activity. The communists did have a significant influence over the Czechoslovak state, but still not enough.

Clearly, the majority of the states in UNSCOP were satellites or neo‐​colonies of the United States. In the UNSCOP, a key:

»question in the discussion on the Special Committee was whether the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe should be linked with the Palestine problem. A European delegate stressed the importance of separating the two:

›… the difficulty of finding a just and satisfactory solution to the Palestine question are increased by the linking together of two problems which are not necessarily interdependent.‹

›The first problem is the question of the future status of Palestine; the second problem is the question of the homeless Jews in Europe. These two problems are usually linked together in every discussion of the Palestine question. It is taken for granted that the only solution of the humanitarian problem of Jewish homelessness is immigration to Palestine and it is thus dependent upon a solution of the political question of the future status of Palestine.‹«⁸

In the end, Washington was able to lobby for the imposition of its will, and the issue of Jewish refugees was linked to the future of Palestine:

»The United States draft (somewhat amended) was approved … and the mission of the Special Committee was approved in broad terms:

›The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine.‹

While avoiding specific reference to the refugee situation in Europe, the Special Committee was authorized to conduct investigations anywhere it considered necessary, thus assuring an indirect linkage of the Jewish refugee issue to the future of Palestine.«⁹

Throughout the sessions of the United Nations, the USSR consistently supported the establishment of a single state of Palestine, an independent bi‐​ethnic democratic state in which the rights of the Israelis and Palestinian Arabs were respected. Indeed, as early as April 15, 1947, the Middle East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued firmly for a single, independent, democratic Palestine. One prominent legal scholar at Harvard University has noted:

»With the United Nations moving to take up Britain’s request, the government of the Soviet Union moved toward formulating a stance. To many in the Soviet foreign affairs establishment, the logical choice was to oppose Zionism and support the Arabs. On April 15, 1947, an internal document was drafted titled ›Memorandum by the Middle East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Palestine Question (for the forthcoming discussion of the Palestine question at the United Nations).‹ The Memorandum, circulated within the Ministry only, stated: ›The United Nations must draw up a constitution for a single, independent and democratic Palestine which will ensure that all the peoples living there will enjoy equal national and democratic rights.‹ Continuing, it recited, ›The United Nations must also act as guarantor for the implementation of its own prerequisites for an independent and democratic Palestine state. The independent and democratic State of Palestine shall be included [as a member] in the United Nations‹.«¹⁰

Clearly, this position of the Soviets:

»was support for the Arab position. The Arabs wanted a Palestine state upon Britain’s withdrawal. That was the view of the Arab Higher Committee, which regarded itself as a government‐​in‐​waiting for Palestine. The Soviet position, as yet confidential, was moving away from the trusteeship proposed in the earlier Soviet paper, in the direction of outright independence for Palestine. Under this approach, the Arab‐​Jewish hostility would be resolved through democratic processes. Migration to Palestine would presumably require the consent of the Arabs. So the USSR would oppose the Zionist desire for a Jewish state.«¹¹

A US diplomatic document confirmed that the USSR was pursuing a policy against Zionism:

»Recent press articles (Embtels 1636, April 30 and 1670, May 6) as well as Gromyko’s conduct in special GA [General Assembly] meeting provide further indication that Soviet policy toward Palestine is based upon:

1. Opposition to formation in all or part of Palestine of Jewish State, which USSR would regard as Zionist tool of West, inevitably hostile to Soviet Union.

2. Support of … independence of Palestine with present Arab majority population. Chambrinski in Red Fleet article was undoubtedly speaking for Soviet Union in declaring ›progressive circles of entire world consider entirely just [the] demand of Palestinian people for independence and democratic path to development‹.«¹²

During the discussions of the UNSCOP, the USSR and Poland argued for an independent and democratic Palestinian state. Dominated by political forces aligned with American finance capital, the UNSCOP rejected these proposals:

»During the discussion in the Committee, the Soviet and Polish representatives proposed amendments to its terms of reference requiring it to submit proposals on the question of establishing ›the independent democratic State of Palestine‹, both amendments being defeated.«¹³

Instead, the UNSCOP had developed a ›majority‹ plan. The ›majority‹ who supported this of course belonged to or leaned towards the American imperialists and thus supported the Zionist project:

»The Special Committee, however, had been unable to agree on recommendations. A majority of members (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) recommended the partition of Palestine into two States that would be politically separate and independent, but would administer a unified economy. Jerusalem would be an international city. The minority (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) proposed an independent Palestine as a federated State with Jerusalem as its capital. Australia did not support either proposal.«¹⁴

Notice that Czechoslovakia belonged to this ›majority‹ faction. It seems unlikely that Czechoslovakia was supporting the ›majority‹ faction as a result of Soviet influence, because the Soviets were openly on the side of the single independent democratic state instead of the partition. The UNSCOP members did agree on the termination of the British occupation of Palestine, however. This inter‐​imperialist conflict was manifested in the fact that the:

»The only unanimous agreement [in UNSCOP] was on the termination of the Mandate, the principle of independence, and a United Nations role:

›The Mandate for Palestine shall be terminated at the earliest practicable date …‹

›Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date …‹«¹⁵

In short, the decision of the UNSCOP was to support the partition and to terminate the British mandate. The UNSCOP majority therefore adopted the line officially held by the Zionists. Note that during this period, the Zionist mainstream was supportive of a strategic partnership with the United States but also pretended to be militantly hostile to the British Empire. Recall also that Britain was the force behind the Zionist mass migration, even though it presented itself as hostile to Zionist mass migration. Recall further that the reason behind this ostensible ›hostility‹ of the Zionists towards the British Empire was rooted in Britain’s strategic alliance with the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, ›the Arabs‹, hence resulting in Britain’s ›hostility‹ the Ben‐​Gurion network, Zionist migration, etc. No informed observer would have ever seriously doubted the fact that the Ben‐​Gurion group, fascist agents of American intelligence as they were, would have been — and were — also allies of the British imperialists.

None of that is to imply that the superficiality of the ›hostility‹ of Israel and Britain was insignificant, since after all the UNSCOP majority line officially supported the withdrawal of Britain in favor of the partition of Palestine. This outwardly pretension of hostility was something that the USSR exploited excellently so to undermine British imperial and Zionist colonial interests in Palestine.

Given the covert alliance of British finance capital and the Israeli bureaucrats led by David Ben‐​Gurion, the presence of the British colonial forces in Palestine served as a de facto reinforcement of the Haganah, the military force of the Ben‐​Gurion network. The removal of the British troops meant the removal of these reinforcements, thereby weakening the Haganah, cutting the Israeli comprador classes’ stock of the means of violence, while relatively empowering the Israeli progressive classes. The weaker the Ben‐​Gurion faction’s military, the less the tendency of the new State of Israel to ethnically cleanse. By contrast, the continued presence of the British colonial forces in Palestine would have drastically reinforced the Ben‐​Gurion faction of the Haganah in its efforts for the wipeout of the inhabitants of Palestine.

Forget not that the ethnic cleansing of the Arabs of Palestine took place less due to the partition in itself but rather due to the military strength of the Haganah. The power of a state arises not by the demarcations it makes on the map but by its ability to enforce such demarcations through the means of violence, through the military and intelligence bodies. The partition exacerbated ethnic tensions as previously discussed, but military power bears more weight in history.

In this midst, after having argued for the removal of the British imperialists in a manner devoid of the partition, the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies most righteously voted for the UN resolution expelling the British imperialists even if at the cost of the partition of Palestine.

Anti‐​Israeli Rejectionism — the belief that the State of Israel is purely and monolithically reactionary, that nothing progressive could possibly exist in or arise from Israel, that not even a scintilla of recognition of Israel must be made — is a dangerously pervasive cult by which many neo‐​leftists and Islamists have been brainwashed. The Rejectionists have no sense of reason and rather speak emotionally about Palestine and Israel. They therefore cannot fathom the concepts explained above. The Rejectionist influence in the Arab society led the Arab states’ delegates to vote against the resolution expelling the British reinforcements of the Haganah, hence voting for a stronger Haganah. The Syrians, the Wafdist Egyptians, and the Lebanese often sympathized with Soviet positions (more on this later) and, if not blackmailed by the Rejectionist current, would have voted on the side of the USSR. However, inevitably responsive to the Rejectionist political culture of parts of the Arab world, lest they be called ›traitors‹ and ›Zionists‹, they too were blackmailed into voting against a resolution that would have expelled the British colonial reinforcers of the Haganah.

The United States would have definitely benefited from both the continued presence of the British Empire in Palestine and the partition of Palestine. The US therefore covertly supported both Britain and the Zionist forces. However, publicly, it had to make a choice between Britain and Israel. Publicly choosing Britain over Israel would have been a ›strategy‹ of utmost foolishness on the part of the American imperialists, since the Americans had spent so many years attempting to cultivate soft power influence among a significant percentage of the Israeli population. The tasks were divided between the Americans and the British; Britain would increase influence in Jordan through British colonial ›anti‐​Zionism‹, whereas America would aim to steal the USSR’s soft power influence among the Ashkenazim by supporting the establishment of a Zionist state as a rival to the Yiddish Autonomous Oblast in the USSR. Furthermore, had the US publicly sided with Britain over Israel, the USSR — already armed with tremendous soft‐​power influence among the Israeli population due to its heroic war against the Nazis — could easily use this decision of the United States as a propaganda tool to drive a deep wedge between Israel and the American regime. In effect, the USSR would have been able to not only dramatically undermine the British, but also to pull Israel away from America so to liberate Israel from American imperialism and to pave the way for Israel to ally with the progressive anti‐​imperialist Arab organizations and states in the region. The result would have been damage to British and American imperialist interests, by extension to Zionist colonial interests. The US would have been monumentally foolish not to publicly side with Zionism ›against‹ Britain. Hence, as yet another evidence of the success of Soviet maneuvering, the US was compelled to join the USSR in supporting the resolution to expel the British imperialists from Palestine.

The USSR also correctly calculated that despite the reactionary character of the Zionist regime, the Soviet soft power among the Jews would greatly pay off. Many individuals harbor the false view that almost all of those who migrated to Palestine migrated wanted to terrorize the Arabs of Palestine. That is not true. Although a considerable percentage of the migrants to Palestine harbored anti‐​Arab chauvinist views, a larger percentage — the staunchly pro‐​Soviet and communist‐​inspired Ashkenazi and Sfaradi proletarians of Eastern Europe who had migrated to Palestine — opposed such anti‐​Arab chauvinism, favoring instead coexistence with the Arabs and alliance with the progressive Arab forces against the British Empire, the American imperialists and the anti‐​Arab chauvinist mainstream tendency in the ›Jewish Agency‹ led by Ben‐​Gurion. The pro‐​Soviet and philo‐​Arabist pressure in the Israeli electorate was so strong that for his electoral campaign, even Ben‐​Gurion had to present himself as a supporter of coexistence with Arabs and friendship with the USSR (see The History of the USSR & the Peoples’ Democracies C16S6 and C16S7). The Soviets were aware of such a current among the people of Israel.

In any case, the Soviet decision regarding Palestine was not a choice between the lesser evils, but was a strong step forward against the imperialist‐​fascist presence in Palestine. Thus, after the UNSCOP rejected the Soviet and Polish delegations’ call for a single state of Palestine, the Soviets reiterated their support for a single‐​state solution, but toned down their line by describing it as a ›more noteworthy‹ option:

»Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of a single Arab‐​Jewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem …«¹⁶

Reflecting the Soviet confrontation with the pro‐​Zionist majority in the UN and the aforementioned dilemma associated with it, the Soviet representative in the United Nations Andrei Gromyko added:

»If this plan proved impossible to implement, … then it would be necessary to consider the second plan … which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab.«¹⁷

It is essential to emphasize, as confirmed by US diplomatic and intelligence documents, that the USSR surely preferred the establishment of a single, integral, independent, democratic Palestinian state, hence opposing the establishment of a Zionist state in Israel and Mufti‐​led Nazi‐​Salafi state in Palestine. A May 27, 1947 US diplomatic report cited a memorandum that was: »Dated May 27, … [and] drafted by officers of EUR…«¹⁸

The EUR was and remains the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, a special branch of analysis for the US State Department, focusing, as the name suggests, on Eurasian affairs. The memorandum, the US diplomatic report stated, analyzed the stance of the USSR on the partition of Palestine:

»The attached memorandum, prepared at your request, and reviewed in EUR and NEA, analyzes the statements on various aspects of the Palestine problem made by the Soviet Delegation at the special session of the General Assembly. The voting record of the Soviet bloc, the Arab States, and the United States on the principal roll call votes taken at the special session is also appended.«¹⁹

The US State Department memorandum stated that while on the surface, it appeared as though the Soviet delegation had a shift of its stance to a Zionist one, in reality there had been no change in the Soviet stance. This was, the memorandum confirmed, because the USSR supported the establishment of a single, territorially integral, bi‐​ethnic, democratic, and independent Palestine as its first choice:

»The memorandum indicates that, despite an apparent shift in the Soviet position at the final meeting of the Assembly, there is no real inconsistency in the various statements of position made by the Soviet Delegation. Throughout, the statements seem designed to straddle the fundamental issue. The Soviets supported … independence after partition if a bi‐​national state proved to be impracticable; and representation for the Great Powers on the special investigating committee.«²⁰

On September 1947, in a meeting of the US delegation to the UN General Assembly, the Soviet position on Palestine was discussed. Indeed, regarding the specific issue of Palestine, the former Assistant Chief of Staff of the US Army and Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, General John Hilldring confirmed that the USSR’s number one choice for Palestine was a federal state: »General Hilldring said that the Russians had already made their position clear. Their first choice was a federal state.«²¹

Another US diplomatic document stated that the:

»UNSCOP majority recommendation … though second‐​choice, would serve Soviet interest in softening up area by … [s]ecuring withdrawal of British and ensuring against their replacement by other great‐​power influence; (…). Soviet offense in Arab eyes would be minimized by prior endorsement [of] partition by UNSCOP majority and USA and by Soviet record in support [for] Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt (already being propagandized, see Embtel [Embassy Telegram] 3205, November 131).«²²

This reality, along with the consistent Soviet support for Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt ›minimized‹, to use the words of the US diplomatic document, the negative view of the USSR ›in Arab eyes‹. In his speech at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947, Zhdanov reaffirmed the Soviet Union’s alliance with Egypt and Syria as two countries aligned with ›anti‐​imperialist and democratic camp‹ ›and anti‐​fascist forces‹:

»A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in post‐​war international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating in the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti‐​democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti‐​imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. … The imperialist camp is also supported by colony‐​owning countries, such as Belgium and Holland, by countries with reactionary anti‐​democratic regimes, such as Turkey and Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent on the United States, such as Near‐​Eastern and South American countries and China.

The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti‐​democratic pro‐​fascist regimes and movements everywhere.

The anti‐​imperialist and anti‐​fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria.«²³

On November 29, 1947, along with the overwhelming majority of the UN, the Soviets voted for the ›majority‹ plan. However:

»While the Soviet Union also voted for partition … the original Soviet stand was in favour of a unified state in Palestine, if it was possible.«²⁴

The Soviet policy on Palestine, opposed to both British and US‐​backed Zionist colonialism, was correct and just, indeed. The explanation for the Soviet line in the UN was also reflected in the Soviet media at the time:

»In an article entitled ›The Arab East and the Palestine Question‹ New Times attempted to indicate the consistency of Soviet policy regarding the solution of the Palestine problem. It asserted that, although Soviet representatives in the U.N. had affirmed the advantages of the minority recommendations for a single state, they considered the proposals for division the only course possible under existing conditions and had only one purpose, namely, to hand Palestine over to the peoples inhabiting it. New Times accused ›British propaganda‹ of working on Arab fears of isolation. It promised the Arabs the support of the antiimperialist camp.«²⁵

Therefore, as evidenced by the facts enumerated above, while the USSR voted for the resolution that resulted in the partition of Palestine, it did not pursue the partition of Palestine as its real goal. It supported the UN resolution in order to expel the British colonists from Palestinian territories. The Soviet opposition to the British presence in the Levant, however, gave the Soviets no delusions about the American imperialists represented in Palestine by Israel’s regime. Given the covert alliance of British finance capital with the bureaucratic rulers of Israel, the expulsion of the British troops from Palestine would have meant a weakening of the Israeli bureaucrats’ hold over Palestine. The US ambassador to Moscow wrote to his boss in Washington:

»Despite lack info GA developments except from Soviet press and fragmentary radio news, we feel obliged register our conviction Soviet policy and tactics toward Palestine question are deliberately calculated to ensure unsettlement, rather than settlement, and to create maximum difficulties for British and Americans in Near East.«²⁶

After the 1947 Palestine vote, in the UN, the Soviet Union undertook complex diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at sowing division in the Anglo‐​American‐​Zionist camp. Obviously, the UN resolution involved both the expulsion of Britain from Palestine, a positive outcome, along with the partition of Palestine, the negative outcome. The Soviets remained consistent with their support for the former outcome. Regarding the latter, they remained consistent with their official vote only nominally. In practice, they did nothing to implement partition and instead worked to make American imperialism’s position in Palestine to ›go from bad to worse‹, to use the CIA’s words. The following is an excerpt of a major CIA document on Palestine:

»the USSR voted for the UN partition of Palestine. From November to May it consistently supported partition but took no initiative in urging effective action to implement partition. Officially the Soviet position was unimpeachable; unofficially, the Kremlin was content to sit back and watch matters go from bad to worse in Palestine.«²⁷

The American attempts to establish trusteeship over Palestine and the efforts to ›mediate‹ ›peace‹ between the Arabs and the Zionist regime would have rendered the US‐​backed Ben‐​Gurion faction and the Saudi‐​backed (hence US‐​backed) gang of the Mufti far stronger in Israel and Palestine. The USSR blocked such American imperialist efforts. As American intelligence put it:

»The Soviet delegation loudly denounced and obstructed the US proposals for a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, the one possibility which might have prevented an Arab‐​Jewish war after 15 May. Since 15 May the delegation has been lukewarm on truce attempts and has obstructed mediation efforts. On 7 July it abstained in the Security Council from voting on the resolution to extend the four weeks’ truce. Although it voted for the resolution on 15 July ordering the belligerents to cease hostilities, it abstained from voting on the proposal to give the UN Mediator authority to negotiate a settlement between Jews and Arabs.«²⁸

Sources

1 The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945 – 55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70. Citing: From Encroachment to Involvement, a Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945 – 1973. Israel University Press, Yaacov Ro’i, 1974, pp. 29 – 30

This article is a sub‐​chapter taken from Saed Teymuri’s The History of the USSR & the Peoples’ Democracies published at sovinform​.net, revised by the author for publication in MagMa Magazine, format adapted, title changed, introduction added, highlighting removed.