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ganization and the Jewish Agency for Palestine prior to the *Kristallnacht* in November, 1938, because both had opposed illegal immigration into Palestine before that time.⁸⁴ In his account of the illegal immigration to Palestine, Ehud Avriel, a former Mossad agent in Vienna, characterized the attitude of German authorities in Vienna as follows: "In prewar Germany, these operations were neither illegal nor secret: the Gestapo office directly across the street from

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The Third Reich and the Palestine Question

By Francis R. Nicosia

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(The Third Reich and the Palestine Question, Francis R. Nicosia, p. 161) https://www.uvm.edu/sites/default/files/nicosia.cv_2018.pdf



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Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews

By Shlomo Aronson, Professor Shlomo Aronson

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Hitler himself had authorized ransoming of "rich Jews" in exchange for "large sums of foreign currency" at the end of 1942. Hence, the offer made by the Bratislava Rescue Committee to Wisliceny, following their irrelevant bid to stop the deportations from Slovakia, to ransom other Jews could have fallen into that category at best.

It could be speculated that Himmler saw in such exchange deals an opening toward negotiations with the West on a separate peace, capitalizing on

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Hitler's limited permission to exchange a few Jews for much money. The requested sum was thus an opening for much more in terms of the very connection thereby created between Himmler and the West using Jews for his genuine political purpose, separate peace, following El Alamein and mainly due to the German defeat at Stalingrad, as argued by several parties involved such as Pomeranz in his postwar memoir and by some scholars ex post facto. One may further argue that Himmler recoiled when Hitler proved

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Pomeranz in Istanbul, Schwalb in Geneva, and several members of a Zionist “Rescue Committee” in Budapest, among them Joel Brand and Rezso Kaszner, came to share a similar concept, or at least adopted for various reasons a similar hope, that a deal (or several separate deals) with the Germans was possible. Such deals depended on outside funding or on the delivery of Allied goods. Once Wisliceny appeared in occupied Budapest with a letter of

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The Self-Defeating Mechanism of the Rescue Efforts

recommendation from Rabbi Weissmandel in Bratislava and was approached by the Hungarian Rescue Committee to renew negotiations he had broken off in August 1943, telling his Slovak counterparts that he might renew them in the future,⁷ these rescue advocates sincerely believed or at least argued that such deals should be pursued. Thus, the ensuing Gestapo Deal concerning the ransoming of the Hungarian Jewry might have been born first in their minds, then returned to them by the Germans as a “real” possibility, and then suggested as such to the suspicious Allies, who, in turn, would look into the matter and finally turn down the suggested “deal.”

On the face of it, there was evidence to the effect that bribing the SS did work, at least in the cessation of the deportations from Slovakia in 1942, a fact believed to have been the result of a bribe “deal” with Wisliceny. Out of this grew the so-called Europa Plan, which was supposed to exclude the rest of the Jews of “Europe” from the gas chambers in exchange for money offered to Wisliceny by Slovak Jewish leaders.

The so-called “rescue debate” seemed to have found here a solid ground. This was especially true when Rabbi Weissmandel’s view of its chances, Wisliceny’s alleged serious intentions, and Wisliceny’s superiors’ alleged willingness to negotiate (if the Slovak Rescue Committee at least had something serious to show in terms of money) were shared by other rescue workers, even if with less bitterness and crusade-like emotions. Some kept repeating that a chance was missed and that rescue in general could have been enhanced if more money had been appropriated by the “conventional” Jewish leadership. In fact, the Zionist leadership and AJDC representatives in Europe invested much thought and energy in regard to the Plan, and in spite of their grave doubts about its origins and purposes, they invested in it the requested advances (although not at the speed believed necessary by the Bratislava Rescue Committee).⁸ The Plan and its collapse became a combined religious and emotional case personally for Weissmandel, whose accusations were posthumously published by ultraorthodox leaders in order to explain the Holocaust their way – as a result of the secularization process among Jews, which led on the one hand to the catastrophe of the European Jews as divine punishment and on the other to the alleged betrayal of Jews at the hands of secular Jews.

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the Slovaks possibly did.⁹ About 60,000 of the 95,000 Slovak Jews were deported to death camps in Poland until August 1942, when the SD branch (Abschnitt) in Bratislava advised its head office (Leitabschnitt) in Vienna that about 59,000 had been deported, about 8,000 had fled to Hungary, and the lives of the remaining 22,000 had been spared by the Slovak authorities. In fact, the deportations continued for several months afterward and then were finally stopped. Indeed, said the report, the number of Jews had shrunk by 67,000, but it should be noted that most of the deported Jews were "small Jews," who had few connections, whereas the rich and influential Jews to a large extent remained in the country. This argument entirely refutes Weissmandel's assumption, and his posthumous allegation, that the Germans were successfully bribed to stop the killings. The SD report

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(‘Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews’, Shlomo Aronson, 2004, p. 174)

Upon his return to the Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University, he was the director of the Center for European Studies, a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution in Washington, the head of the Holocaust Research Chair at the University of California in Los Angeles, a visiting scholar at the Library of Congress in Washington and the Holocaust Museum there, and a consultant to the inter-ministerial working group for the release of Holocaust documents according to a law of the US Congress. He served as a historical consultant to documentary filmmakers of the German television on the Anza Conference and Reinhard Heydrich, and of the BBC on Hitler and Himmler and the Holocaust in Hungary.

In the 1981 elections for the Tenth Knesset, Aaronson was a candidate for the Knesset on behalf of the Telam party. In the 1960s, Aharonson was one of the founding team of Israeli television, headed by Elyahu Katz and including quite a few radio personalities who moved to television, including Haim Yavin, Yigal Lusin, and others. Shlomo Aharonson was the news director in the founding team, served as the director of the news department at Israeli television in its beginnings, and was one of the first editors of the edition of "Mvat Le Hachot". Prof. Aaronson's academic career spanned decades. He taught at the Hebrew University the study of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, alongside the study of Israel's foreign and security policy. Aaronson has published many books and publications that deal, among other things, with the First World War, the SS, the Gestapo and the "Final Solution", nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and more. In the 1981 elections for the 10th Knesset, Aaronson was a candidate for the Knesset on behalf of the Telam party - a movement for state renewal, led by Moshe Dayan.

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הסופר שלמה אהרונוסון

הספרים שכתב שלמה אהרונוסון

היטלר, בעלות הברית והיהודים
מאת שלמה אהרונוסון



ספר זה מתאר את השואה כמילכוד מכל צד, שלתוכו נקלעו היהודים מאז עלייתו של היטלר לשלטון ועד לסופו של הרייך השלישי. מילכוד שקלע את יהודי אירופה בין הפטישי הנאצי לבין של הסדן של בעלות הברית ללא מוצא. רוב מאמצי ההצלה שנעשו לא הועילו והפכו לבומרנג נגד המצילים. הוויכוח אם ניתן להציל, ומי אשם בכך שלא ניצלו רבים, מחייב הכרת התיעוד והעדויות המובאים לפני הקורא בספר זה, לאור פתיחת הארכיונים בעולם ובישראל: ממוסקבה ועד ברלין, מוויינגטון ועד לונדון ותל-אביב. ההחלטה על 'הפתרון הסופי' ושלביו, נסיבות ההחלטה וביצועה לשלביה, ארץ ישראל במלחמה, הוויכוח הישראלי-יהודי על מהלכי הנהגת היישוב בתקופת השואה, 'המרד' של לח"י ואצ"ל, השואה בהונגריה ופרשת "הסחורה תמורת דם", הסאגה של ישראל קסטנר ו'משפט קסטנר', הפצצת אושוויץ, מהלכי המלחמה בחזיתות השונות ושיקולי הנשיא רזוולט וראש ממשלת בריטניה צ'רצ'יל, סטלין והלחימה הנוראה במזרח, כולם נידונים כאן בעיקרם על יסוד תיעוד בלתי ידוע עד כה שעודכן מאז צאתה של המהדורה האנגלית לאור. עיקר התיעוד מוצא במסמכים גרמניים שהיו גנוזים עד לאחרונה, ואשר מהלכיו, מדימותיו, וטירופו הגזעני של אדולף היטלר עולים ממנו בפירוט ומטילים צל נורא ומכריע על מהלכיהם ועל רשעותם של הבריטים, האמריקנים והסובייטים ועל הדילמות של ההנהגות היהודיות בשואה. בפרקים האחרונים מדובר בסירובן של בעלות הברית להעניק לשואת היהודים מעמד משלה במשפטי נירנברג עד שהיא כפתה את עצמה עליהם, ובהפיכתה של השואה לכלי פוליטי בידי חרדים, קיצונים ימניים ופוסט-ציוניים עד ימינו אנו. שלמה אהרונוסון (1936) נולד בתל אביב. בימי לימודיו באוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים היה עורך חדרות בקול ישראל, וכשלמד בגרמניה היה כתב קול ישראל שם. לאחר מכן היה מנהל החדשות בטלוויזיה הישראלית. כן שימש פרשן בתחנות רדיו וטלוויזיה בארץ ובח"ל ובעתונות הישראלית. בשונו למחלקה למדע המדינה באוניברסיטה העברית היה מנהל המרכז ללימודים אירופיים, חוקר אורח במוסד ברוקינגס בוויינגטון, ראש הקתדרה לחקר השואה באוניברסיטת קליפורניה בלוס אנג'לס, חוקר אורח בספריית הקונגרס בוויינגטון ובמוזיאון השואה שם, ויועץ לקבוצת העבודה הבינמשרדית לשחרור מסמכי השואה על פי חוק של הקונגרס האמריקאי. הוא שימש כיועץ היסטורי ליוצרי סרטים דוקומנטריים של הטלוויזיה הגרמנית על ועידת ואנזה ועל ריינהרד היידריך, ושל בי.בי.סי על היטלר והימלר ועל השואה בהונגריה. כן ארגן שלושה כנסים בינלאומיים על תיעוד ארכיוני חדש בקשר לשואה וקשיי ההצלה מן השואה, וערך פרסומים וציאות הכנס הראשון שיצא בהוצאת אוניברסיטת בן-גוריון בשם "תיעוד חדש - פרספקטיבות חדשות" בשפה האנגלית. כן כיהן כראש מכון שאשא לסמינרים בינלאומיים באוניברסיטה העברית ויזם במסגרתו כנס בינלאומי על

בבחירות 1981 לכנסת העשירית היה אהרונוסון מועמד לכנסת מפלגת תל"ם בשנות ה-60 נמנה אהרונוסון עם צוות ההקמה של הטלוויזיה הישראלית שבראשו עמד אליהו לוי וכלל לא מעט אנשי רדיו שעברו לטלוויזיה ובהם חיים יבין, יגאל לוסין ועוד. שלמה אהרונוסון היה מנהל החדשות בצוות ההקמה. שימש כמנהל מחלקת החדשות בטלוויזיה הישראלית הראשונה והיה מהעורכים הראשונים של מהדורת "מבט לחדשות". הקריירה האקדמית של פרופ' אהרונוסון נמשכה עשרות שנים ואז לימד באוניברסיטה העברית חקר גרמניה הנאצית והשואה. לצד חקר מדיניות החוץ והביטחון של ישראל, אהרונוסון פירסם ספרים ופרסומים רבים שעסקים בין השאר במלחמת העולם הראשונה, באס-אס, בגסטפו וב"פתרון הסופי". בנוסף הגרעיני במזרח התיכון ועוד. בבחירות 1981 לכנסת העשירית היה אהרונוסון מועמד לכנסת מטעם מפלגת תל"ם - תנועה להתחדשות ממלכתית. בראשות משה דיין, המפלגה קיבלה שני מנדטים בלבד ואהרונוסון לא נבחר לכנסת.

were all kinds of things between us of no great importance; at any rate, I was sure of his sympathy and I said we could try that direction.

The second question was which one of us would be in charge of the departure. I had to give an immediate answer. I said I personally would take responsibility. And I added I had reliable people with me. Until the last minute, I didn't know if this was a trap. It wasn't simple, since the UB was in charge of the borders and if I said the He-Halutz organization was responsible (I don't remember if He-Halutz was legitimate then)—even if it was all right legally—if the authorities decided one day that someone on the border wasn't proper, He-Halutz would have to take the responsibility. So I answered that I personally would be responsible.

Two things stood out in their position: first, that they needed support and without it they couldn't help; and the support had to be political, from someone in the government. And in consultation, the lot fell to Marian Spychalski. The second thing was who on the Jewish side would take responsibility. It didn't occur to anyone on the Central Committee of the Jews in Poland that we confronted operations of such a nature and scope. However, I couldn't give He-Halutz that responsibility for fear we would be swallowed up. That was what motivated me to assume the responsibility myself.

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They wrote down the summary and I said immediately that as soon as I got an answer from Spychalski, I would get in touch with them.

After first and second thoughts, I decided to let Dr. Adolf Berman in on the secret. I already said that toward the end of the war, before the Polish Uprising, in a conversation about what would happen in the future, I realized we had differences of opinion. He was a "legalist," and he declared that. He also believed in some delusions, like the establishment of a Communist State of Israel; and he also believed in the new relationship of world and Polish communism to the Zionist enterprise, if and when everything was done legally. That was his reservation. I didn't believe in those things. I told him that our people and I had already worked illegally on the borders of the Communist zone in 1939 and 1940, but I imagined that wouldn't be simple for us now. And I said that legalism couldn't be the reservation for our acts. When we met after the war, we didn't continue that discussion.

In 1944, that was a theoretical question, because we didn't know if we'd survive. Then there was the Polish Uprising. Nothing practical was to be decided, and the decision wasn't in our hands; the Germans were still in Warsaw. Even though I knew Berman's world, his points of view, I had no reason in January, after the Liberation, to start an argument with him on precisely that Zionist point and to reveal to him what we were or weren't doing. We confronted certain areas of activity where we had to work together, in the issues of Polish Jewry, in things done legally; but

vivors; but I also have no doubt that, with all its will, it cannot guarantee the lives of the Jews in Poland; what happened is evidence of that. We are between the hammer and the anvil. On the one hand, we are not allowed to leave for various reasons. On the other hand, our lives can't possibly be protected. I'm not thinking only of the dead. What will happen to the living? They are killed on trains and everywhere else, and then there's a pogrom in Kielce! And there will surely be other places. Open the door for the Jews to leave!" He was a senior official and, at that moment, he didn't respond to what I had said. But within forty-eight hours, I got a phone call at the Committee of the Jews in Poland, not from that man himself, but from one of the senior members of UB, asking to meet with me. We made an appointment at a certain café.

That meeting began with a friendly conversation. I won't mention that man's name because I don't know exactly what his situation and fate are today, and I prefer to be cautious. And I don't know the real names of those who were involved, one of whom was a Jew. The two men I talked with said they had been told what I said on the plane, and they had a few questions about it and a few difficulties with it. First of all, even if they were sympathetic to the departure of the Jews for Palestine, they couldn't give permission for such a departure unless they had government support; and their question was whether I could meet with the foreign minister, since the support should be given by the Foreign Ministry. And if the Foreign Ministry adopted such a policy, they would make sure it was carried out. The foreign minister was Zygmunt Modzelewski.

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They didn't deal with foreign relations, but it wasn't hard for me to tell them what Modzelewski had told me, and I knew that despite his sympathy, he would give me the same answer connecting this with Polish interests and relations with Britain. And I knew that even if he knew about the departure of the Jews, he would have to say he didn't. Then they started listing names of other members of the government. Maybe Osóbka-Morawski, the prime minister? I told them about my meeting with him on the day of the Kielce pogrom. Then one of them asked how my relations were with Marian Spychalski, who was then—if I'm not mistaken—deputy minister of defense. He was my friend from the underground when, even if we weren't seeing one another, each one knew what the other was doing. More precisely, I knew more about him than he knew about me since he and his friend, the engineer Turbyński, who was later mayor of Warsaw, were close friends of Wacek Folman, Hawka's older brother, an architect. They had known one another before the war; and during the war, Turbyński had helped Folman when he came to the Aryan side. After the war, we had several meetings both about restoring the farm in Grochów and about the apartment I got, thanks to him. There

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THE POGROMS IN KIELCE

now we confronted the illegal departure, which we had started in January and February 1945; and Berman didn't know about those things since I never talked to him about them. I would meet with him at the Committee of the Jews in Poland and would also come to his home. After the Polish parliament was established, he was a member of it, we would meet in all kinds of places, as well as with the family, and we were friends. We talked about everything except Brikha and our illegal work.

Now I decided to talk with him. I saw him as the person closest to us on the Committee of the Jews in Poland. Moreover, to his credit or not, among the gallery of Zionist activists, he was best known among the Polish leaders because of his brother, Jakub Berman, the Communist. Yosef Sak, member of Po'alei Zion-Z.S., was also there; but at that decisive period of the underground, on the Aryan side of Warsaw, for various reasons, he was remote from issues and sat at home while the political representative on the Jewish National Committee was Dr. Berman. He knew the people I knew, like Gomułka and Spychalski, and had contacts with many others I didn't know.

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Now in that conversation I initiated, I told him of how things had evolved. I also told him what Modzelewski, the foreign minister had told me and about my last conversation with the members of UB. I told him I had concluded, along with them, that the only one who might be able to consider these things globally and calculate Poland's relations with England and what that required was Marian Spychalski, and we knew him from the underground; he was reliable and imaginative. "Maybe that will work," I told Berman.

Berman agreed immediately. We got in touch with Spychalski and were accepted without delay. I'll never forget Spychalski's reaction—the meeting with him was warm. Like us, he was shocked by the pogrom in Kielce. As far as I'm concerned, all Spychalski's later sins in general issues and Jewish matters cannot obscure his sympathy toward us in this case. We didn't tell him about our conversations or the replies we had gotten from the prime minister.

On the spot, he called the general in charge of the borders, a Soviet military man whose name was Czerwiński. I realized immediately that he was a Russian of Polish origin. His Polish was very "Russified." He was commander of the border patrol, the military patrol in charge of all the borders of Poland.

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Spychalski said one thing to Czerwiński in our presence: Do not under any circumstances use the northern borders, that is, toward Berlin; use the southern route, across the Czech border. Czerwiński told him, if I'm not mistaken, that the distance between the new Polish border (the Oder-Neisse line) and Berlin was only seventy kilometers and there was a Soviet garrison there, whereas the Polish army was on the southern border. A

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THE POGROMS IN KIELCE

few of our comrades in Brikha didn't accept that warning and later cost us lives. Some of them behaved irresponsibly at a certain moment when they were under pressure; they thought they should and could "open" the northern border, too. This time, in terms of the army, the arrangement was completely legal. When we received the positive reply, a meeting was arranged with Czerwiński. I assumed a certain pretense and, as someone who dealt with people of ministerial rank, I said I would send my man to meet with Czerwiński. That man was Stefan Grajek. We also wanted to demonstrate that there was no need to negotiate with Czerwiński, but simply to fix border crossings. So Stefan Grajek was selected as the liaison with General Czerwiński. Right after I got Spychalski's positive answer and after he appointed the commander of the border patrol, Czerwiński, to deal with the matter, I gathered our members of Brikha, Isser Ben-Zvi, Zvi Netzer, and Yohanan Cohen, a member of the Labor Zionists, one of the independent liberals, who was also a Shaliah from Eretz Israel.⁶ Without going into details, I proposed to them to indicate border crossings we would suggest to Czerwiński. I also suggested we not expose the places we had secretly used thus far; and, if this was a trap, or some day they decided to stop, we would always have the crossings we had used. I

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At a symposium on Yehuda Bauer's book at Efa'el, Leviteh asked me to take issue with a few things. He claimed that allowing Jews to leave en masse couldn't possibly remain the property of one branch of government and not be known to the general government institutions; and that it couldn't be concealed from the citizens of Poland, because the day after the agreement, the Jews began selling their possessions and moving and all Poland knew about it. No doubt such a thing couldn't have been done underground, vis-à-vis other branches of the administration. But as far as I know, the Foreign Ministry was cautious about giving the issue official public approval, which could have damaged Poland.

I must also say that as far as I know, there wasn't an agreement between various branches of government. I don't know what authority Leviteh had for his remarks. I must say that in that position, Spychalski didn't ask the Foreign Ministry. True, those things couldn't be kept secret. In fact, a person in a key position soon responded sharply to the issue. But at first, nothing was known about it. For a few days or weeks, it was kept secret—I don't know.

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Leviteh also claimed there couldn't have been such an agreement without the knowledge of the Soviet authorities. Did the Russians know about Brikha, and what was their attitude? I don't know what happened at the cabinet meeting, what Modzelewski said, what they said among themselves, or what Moscow said. There may be all kinds of speculations, but I don't know the facts. What I can do is reconstruct the course of things. And I state here that the decision came at that stage, within a few minutes, in the conversation Dr. Berman and I had with Spychalski. If the Polish government wanted to ruin it, they would have. Jakub Berman knew about it, too. Not at that moment, but a few days later. If he had wanted, he could have ruined it. The same goes for Moscow. Jakub Berman certainly didn't keep quiet without asking Moscow. I reject Leviteh's thesis, at least in regard to the first stage, and I can't say how long it went on—one day or two weeks. *I think that there was an historical, fateful decision here, made by Spychalski.* If we hadn't gone to him, if we had gone to the minister or to another ministry that would have considered the case from another angle, I don't know if the Jews would have crossed the borders as they did.

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Could Spychalski, who was acting Minister of Defense, have decided such a thing on his own? At any rate, the fact is that, when he accepted

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Now the episode of Michael Weichert.²² He was one of the greatest theatrical talents of Polish Jewry. Professionally he was a lawyer. As I recall, he cooperated with the Germans during World War I; but that was a totally different and positive cooperation. In any case, he had close contacts with them. He was a devoted of German culture, the representative of the Jewish Social Self-Help (YISA), and later the Yidisher hilfs komitet (YHK, whose initials were also YSS, but the Germans ordered the name changed because of the "SS"). That was an umbrella organization of welfare operations. I never heard anything good about Weichert, but that's not to censure him. I heard that he wasn't an easy or a friendly person; but that doesn't say anything against Weichert either.

The Weichert incident began after we picked up on the intensive social activity he was carrying out in 1943, after the Uprising. We realized that just when the Germans were taking the Jews of Warsaw, the Jews of Poland, even the Jews of Kraków to death, Weichert, following orders from the Germans, formed JUS (Jüdische Unterstützungstelle) to replace the YHK. At the same time that the Germans were executing Jews, they assigned him to summon the Jewish world abroad to send material aid: medicine, food, and so forth. And the simple question arose of what was the purpose of these letters of appeal sent by a well-known figure of

22. See above, chapter 3. Weichert's memoirs present his version of events. (See Weichert 1963 and 1970.)

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ON THE EDGE OF THE ABYSS

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the prewar era, and during the war as well, a man who led welfare operations and represented the Jews vis-à-vis the German institutions?

His letters abroad, sent in those very months of bloodshed and mass murder, created the impression abroad that this money was needed for the hungry. True, Jews were dying of starvation, in 1941–1942 and in 1943; but in 1944, that was no longer the problem. The difference between him and Ringelblum, and even between him and Kirshenbaum, was that those Jews did everything to alarm the world to the fact that the Germans were killing us—simple murder! Whereas Weichert requested material aid in his letters; and, if material aid was requested, it was requested for live Jews! So we suspected this activity as a first class deceit. This assessment didn't come only from Jewish sources, we heard it from Polish sources too, for example, the Polish Committee for Welfare in Warsaw (RGO), a few of whose members cooperated with us in ZEGOTA; one of these was Marek Arczyński, the democrats' representative. (He was in Israel a few years ago and we entertained him.) Everyone felt that Weichert was a traitor, that he was doing the work of the Germans.

Berman and me, he didn't know why we had come. And when he gave his positive answer—I'm certain of it—he didn't pick up the telephone to call the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other element in the government. He gave the approval of his own, without asking. Before I came to him, I sat with members of the UB, who gave me all kinds of advice: to appeal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister—and I rejected it; and only then did Spychalski's name come up. So, Spychalski didn't know in advance why we came to him. At that time, there was not yet a bureaucracy that obliged Dr. Berman and Yitzhak Zuckerman to inform Spychalski in advance what they wanted to discuss with him. We asked for an audience and he agreed. And, in our presence, he didn't ask anyone for permission; and, on the spot, he called the man in charge of the borders. He didn't ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he didn't ask the Party, not did he ask the opinion of the he Prime Minister. True, it was impossible to hide it, either from the Polish public or from the circles of Polish leadership. But the fact is they didn't know. For example, the "great Berman" (Jakub Berman) didn't know. Zvi Netzer could testify to that too.

So, it is conceivable to me that Spychaski did it on his own, perhaps out of naïveté, perhaps because of his attitude toward Jews, perhaps because of the proximity to the Kielce incident, or because of the clash between his Communist theory and the Polish reality. These things and God knows what else might have caused that. At any rate, he accepted it openly and immediately gave permission right then and there. True, nothing was written and no agreement, no document was signed; it was all an oral conversation.

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For example, Mordechai Anielewicz—he was a brilliant lecturer—said that if the Red Army (this was back in 1940) went into the Middle East and occupied Eretz Israel, we would welcome them with open arms. They would occasionally invite me to attend the sort of conferences we attend today in Israel. I said then that the entrance of the Red Army into Eretz Israel could be the end of Zionism, so I wouldn't welcome them gladly; naturally, I said, we might not have the strength to resist them. That was the big difference in conception. Moreover, in a history workshop held

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Anielewicz was a leftist, so was Braslaw. If they had remained alive in Poland after the war, they would have gone with Rifkin.¹²⁵ But not

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Weichert was the only Jew who didn't wear the Magen-David armband. He lived in his own house on the Aryan side, when there were no more Jews in Kraków. The remnants of Kraków Jewry were gathered in the Plaszów concentration camp, whereas he lived in Kraków under German protection and ran their errands. He received several shipments of food from abroad. When we learned that, we did two things: we wrote to London condemning the letters published in his name—in order to expose Weichert and proclaim that he was not the representative of the Jews; the second thing was to send Marek Arczyński to Weichert to persuade him to give up that disgraceful work and to suggest he go underground. We were willing to accept responsibility for his safety under the circumstances. At that time it didn't occur to us to issue a death sentence against him. We thought we would hide him in Kraków or someplace else and support him, although I'm sure he didn't need our money. We said we would provide an Aryan document for him; but he rejected our proposals. (We had a branch of self-help in Kraków led by Marianska, who is now head of Yad Vashem in Tel Aviv.)

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When changes occurred in the status of the Plaszów concentration camp, Weichert announced he was willing to accept our offer; but when he realized that his position with the Germans was as firm as it had been, he again avoided accepting our judgment. He had two "forced" assistants, Dr. Eliahu Tish²³ and Dr. Haim Hilfstein,²⁴ in the Plaszów camp. Wei-

23. Dr. Eliahu Tish: An attorney, journalist, and, according to Weichert, "an outstanding speaker." A democratic Zionist, who immigrated to Israel after the Liberation (Weichert 1963:78; Weichert 1970:23).

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chert, as I said, was the only person in Kraków who operated freely. Those two were well-known public figures, honest men, members of *Et Livnot* (the right-wing faction of the General Zionists). But we couldn't say anything to Tish and Hilfstein since they were both prisoners in the camp. Not Weichert. Ultimately, he disappeared.

There were meetings and discussions that resulted in a death sentence against him. He survived only because of our weakness. At that time, in 1944, we didn't have a force in Kraków to carry out the sentence; I would have had to send at least one armed man on the train to Kraków to carry out the sentence, which meant abandoning the agent to his fate. That wasn't simple. If there had been a branch of the Jewish Fighting Organization in Kraków, the situation would have been different. But that was after December, after events in Kraków, and the collapse in Bochnia, when there was only a remnant of ZOB left.²⁵ I couldn't figure out a way to do it; I would have thought it impossible to send an armed man 400 kilometers to search for his victim for days. So the traitor survived.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 254)

<https://archive.org/details/surplusofmemory00yitz/page/504/mode/2up>

Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust

edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki

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Jarosław Piekałkiewicz Edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki

Tragically, the constant stream of information about the murder of Jews provided by the Polish Underground State to the Polish Government-in-Exile, which it turn passed it on to the Allied governments and to the Western media was not believed. It was often viewed as exaggerated propaganda stemming from Poles deep hatred of the Germans. Even the desperate appeals from Polish Jewish underground organizations, which confirmed this information, was ignored not only by the Western governments, but also by many Jews in Western countries (see below). To those who wanted to help, the only open avenue appeared to be through the International Red Cross (IRC) and its affiliate the German Red Cross. The latter was completely controlled by the Nazis and thus making it the guardian of aid to Jews was the same as putting a fox in charge of protecting a chicken coop. JOINT's branch in Lisbon, Portugal, a neutral country, sent food and medicine parcels through the IRC, addressed either to the JUS in Kraków (see chapter 8), or other addresses in Poland. Between February and April 1943, 12,559 parcels were sent. Of this number only 925, or 7.36 percent were received by the addressees. The rest was obviously stolen by Germans. Even more disastrous was the shipment of 7,226

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parcels late in 1943 when only 42, or a bare 0.58 percent, were delivered to their destinations (Bauer 1981, 331). The other German scam (discussed in chapter 8) was the permission for JOINT and the World Jewish Congress, with the assistance of the German Red Cross, to send whole train cars with food and medicine from Switzerland to the Michał Weichert's JUS operation in Kraków. Despite constant warnings from the Jewish Underground in Poland that Weichert was a German agent and that most of the shipments went

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to the SS, Jewish leaders in the West felt that even if a small amount reached the camps, it was worth the effort.

Eventually, JOINT did discover its error but it "acted very late. . . . It was

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Another very harmful operation was run by Dr. Michał Weichert, a Jew, in cooperation with the Germans. The Germans permitted a Jewish welfare organization to function in the GG, the Jüdische Unterstützungsstelle (JUS), headed by Weichert, to appeal for help from international Jewry. Weichert first operated from Warsaw, but then transferred his office to Kraków, where he lived in his own house outside the Kraków Ghetto, moved freely around the city, and was not required to wear the Star of David armband. He wrote letters to international Jewish Organizations claiming that Jews were not being exterminated, but only interned in work camps. His efforts led to shipments of food and medicines being sent from Switzerland through the International Red Cross for distribution to Jews in need. It is calculated that only about 10 percent of all these shipments reached their Jewish recipients in the camps—the rest was robbed by Germans, with the full knowledge and collaboration of Weichert. The letters and shipments continued even after most of the Jews, including those in the labor camps, had been exterminated. International Jewish organizations chose to believe Weichert, who had been highly respected before the war,⁶ rather than the information provided on the Holocaust by the Underground State, the ŻKN (Jewish National Committee), and the Bund through the Polish Government-in-Exile.

(Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust, author: Jarosław Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki, 2020, p. 261)

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PROFESSOR EMERITUS WILL BE PRESENTED POLISH AWARD FOR BRAVERY DURING NAZI OCCUPATION
 Tue, 07/20/2021

LAWRENCE — Jarosław (Andrzej) Piekalkiewicz, professor emeritus of political science and Russian & East European studies at the University of Kansas, will be awarded the Krzyż Walecznych (Cross of the Brave) this week by the government of Poland. Piekalkiewicz earned the award for his bravery during World War II, but he is only receiving it in 2021 after a long delay caused by the tumultuous events that followed the war.

.ku.edu Professor emeritus will be presented Polish award for bravery during Nazi occupation | TI

Piekalkiewicz was 13 years old when World War II broke out. After experiencing a few years under Nazi occupation in Poland, Piekalkiewicz took a more active role in fighting the Nazis. He soon became a resistance fighter at the age of 15. When he was 18 years old, he fought the Nazis in World War II for 63 days during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. During the war, he was repeatedly captured by the Nazis, escaping three times as a POW and later joining the Polish II Corps that was formed under the auspices of the British Army.



For his bravery, he was promoted to the rank of platoon sergeant and awarded the Krzyż Walecznych. In the chaos of combat, the actual medal could not be awarded, though notice of the award was transmitted to the Polish government in exile in London. After the war, Poland's communist government refused to decorate many of the Polish insurgents like him. Piekalkiewicz immigrated to the United States, earned his doctorate in political science from Indiana University, then came to KU in 1963 because of its Center for Soviet and East European Institute, now the Center for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies (CREES). He played a crucial role in developing East European studies at KU and served as assistant director.

He retired in 2000 and still lives in Lawrence, yet according to current CREES Director Erik Scott, Piekalkiewicz "remains a very engaged scholar as well as a living link to the harrowing experience of life under Nazi occupation."

Piekalkiewicz also published a book titled "Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust" (Hamilton Books, 2019). The book is about Polish

http://news.ku.edu/2021/07/20/professor-emeritus-will-be-presented-polish-award-bravery-during-nazi-occupation

All through German-occupied Poland ZSS branches came into being, many already operating spontaneously as skeletons of the prewar service agencies. Within a year, the ZSS had 118 branches, 38 in large cities. By the beginning of 1942, it had 412 branches. ZSS personnel was recruited from the recognized social-service agencies and other communal institutions. Its founder and head was Michal Weichert (1890-1967), a man of many talents, trained in law, the theater, and literature. A teacher in a Jewish gymnasium in Warsaw, he served as legal adviser to the JDC and ORT, and enjoyed a career as journalist, actor, and director before the war. In mid-1942 the Germans dissolved the ZSS, but later reconstituted it as the *Jüdische Unterstützungsstelle* (JUS; Jewish Relief Office). Technically still under the Interior Department's jurisdiction, JUS in fact fell under SS control. The Jewish underground thereafter regarded JUS in the same light as the Judenräte. (After the war, Weichert was tried in Poland on charges of collaboration, but was exonerated. He spent the last years of his life in Israel.)

ZSS's basic strategy was to rescue what could be rescued. Once, early

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(‘The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945’, Lucy S. Dawidowicz, p. 244) <https://archives.jdc.org/new-book-from-left-to-right-lucy-s-dawidowicz/>

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(The Jewish Heroes of Warsaw: The Afterlife of the Revolt, Avinoam Patt, 2021)

Since the ZSS was accredited to the German civil administration, it had access to supplementary supplies of food, clothing, and medicine that were not available to the Judenräte. Quantities were small, to be sure, but in the economy of scarcity prevailing in the ghettos, even small amounts extracted from the Germans were beyond price. The very fact that the ZSS received supplies from the Germans heightened the contrast in the Jewish public mind between the Judenrat and the ZSS. As one ZSS official put it, it appeared that the Judenräte took from the Jews to give to the Germans, whereas the ZSS took from the Germans to give to the Jews.³

ZSS funding came largely from the JDC, which spent about \$1 million a year in Poland until America's entry into the war, on December 7, 1941, halted the legal transfer of funds. Some moneys were obtained by voluntary donations, fund-raising drives, theater and concert benefits. (In one community, the local ZSS raised a substantial sum in October 1941 by selling the opportunity to bless the *etrog* in the celebration of Succot.) ZSS funding came also from the Judenräte, some of which subcontracted part or most of their welfare programs to the ZSS.

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New Book—From Left to Right: Lucy S. Dawidowicz, the New York Intellectuals, and the Politics of Jewish Histor

highly successful in obtaining funds for kibbutzim from local committees.⁶⁰ As Zuckerman noted later, he took advantage of his position on the Central Committee of Polish Jews to secure funds for the HeHalutz activities.⁶¹ He was also successful in tapping connections in the JDC as a source for Bricha funding. Zuckerman leveraged his close wartime relationship with the JDC representative in Warsaw, David Guzik (who had helped finance the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and worked with the Jewish National Committee after the revolt), to continue JDC support for his efforts after Guzik reestablished the JDC office in Warsaw after the war.⁶² As Zuckerman recalled in his memoirs, his early connections with the Joint were vital not only in securing money for Dror, but in assisting the Joint in establishing connections in Poland. Zuckerman's networking enabled him to obtain funding not only for his own movement (Dror), for Hehalutz in general, but also to make requests on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine as needed—all through his close connections to Guzik and Joe Schwartz, director of European operations for the JDC.⁶³

In 1946, Lucy left YIVO and returned to Europe as an education worker for the JDC. She worked at the Offenbach Archival Depot (OAD)—the repository for printed material pillaged by the Germans—as the JDC representative authorized to select books for distribution to DPs. While working at OAD, she became responsible for cataloging the books which she recognized as belonging to YIVO and ensuring their shipment to YIVO in New York City. The recovery of YIVO's library was historically significant and helped to establish YIVO in New York as a critical institutional link to the East European Jewish past.

In 1947, Dawidowicz transferred to the **Belsen DP camp** in the British zone, where she continued to work for the JDC, providing educational material and supplies to the DPs and initiating cultural and recreational programs.

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**BRIEF REPORT OF THE ACTIVITY
OF THE "J U S"**

From May 12 to July 31, 1943

The Jewish Relief Agency for the General Government "J U S" renewed, at the end of April, its activities by authorization of the Superior S.S. and Police Chiefs in the General Government under the supervision of the General Government's Administration, main department of Internal Administration, section of Population and Welfare. The authorities assigned to it the building at No 2a Jozefinska where offices, drug distribution service and stores have been.

The main purpose of "J U S" consists in distributing to Jewish labor camps, to districts inhabited by Jews and to factories where Jews are employed, drugs, food as well as clothes and linen received as gift packages from abroad or obtained through exchange or by supplementary purchases.

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Krakow, August 1, 1943

**J U S
Jewish Relief Agency
for the General Government**

Dr. Weichert

(‘BRIEF REPORT OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE “JUS”: From May 12 to July 31, 1943’, Jewish Relief Agency for the General Government (JUS), Letter by: Dr. Michael Weichert, Krakow, August 1, 1943, p. 1) <http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/resources/images/wrb/wrb0236.pdf>
www.hartford.edu Avinoam Patt - University of Hartford

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Avinoam J. Patt, PhD worked as the Miles Lerman Applied Research Scholar for Jewish Life and Culture at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM). He received his PhD in Modern European History and Hebrew and Judaic Studies from New York University. His first book, *Finding Home and Homeland: Jewish Youth and Zionism in the Aftermath of the Holocaust* (published by Wayne State University Press, May 2009) examines the appeal of Zionism for young survivors in Europe in the aftermath of the Holocaust and their role in the creation of the state of Israel.

Patt is also the co-editor (with Michael Berkowitz) of a collected volume on Jewish Displaced Persons, titled *We are Here: New Approaches to the Study of Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany* (Wayne State University Press, February 2010). He is a contributor to several projects at the USHMM and is a co-author of the source volume, entitled *Jewish Responses to Persecution, 1938-1940* (USHMM/Alta Mira Press, September 2011). He has also published numerous articles, book chapters, and encyclopedia articles on various topics related to Jewish life and culture before, during, and after the Holocaust and is director of the In Our Words Interview Project with the children and grandchildren of Holocaust survivors.

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DRAFT WORKING PAPER

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By early April, Capt. Jules Koenig, a member of X-2's small base in Vienna (the main office was in Salzburg), submitted a proposal to Headquarters "to use the influx of Jewish refugees into Austria from Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland for sources of CI information, for exact data on the Intelligence service of the Jewish Agency in Austria, and for all intelligence activities run by any persons or organizations who use this influx into Austria for such purpose."¹¹ (S)

Koenig, born in Belgium of Polish Jewish parentage, had served with OSS as an Army officer in the Middle East and in Italy. At the end of the war, he transferred to Austria and joined X-2 in Vienna. In his new assignment, Koenig observed firsthand the immigration networks flowing through the Austrian capital.¹² Koenig emphasized that the Jewish underground flight was not a new phenomenon. "The exodus of Jews from Russian-occupied countries," Koenig commented, "is an exact replica of the vast legal or

¹¹ SCIA, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. Maj. Barry also informed the chief of the Austrian Mission about the new project in his monthly update. See Maj. Barry to Commanding Officer, SSU, War Department Mission to Austria, "Progress Report Covering the Period of 1-30 April 1946 X-2 Branch," 30 April 1946, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 3, Folder 46, CIA ARC. (S)

¹² Jules Koenig (also spelled Koenig) was born in Ostend, Belgium, in 1912, the son of Polish immigrants. He served in the Belgian army at the outbreak of the war and was evacuated to Great Britain after the fall of France. He worked for the Belgian Red Cross and held a variety of other jobs until he moved to the United States in 1942. Koenig was employed as a diamond cutter in New York when he was inducted into the US Army in 1943. Commissioned as a Signal Corps officer, Koenig joined OSS that same year. He remained in SSU until June 1946 when he returned to the United States and was discharged from the Army. Koenig reentered the diamond business in New York and was in periodic contact with former members of OSS. Koenig died in 1989. Jules Koenig, OSS Index Card, in WASH-HQ&HQ-DET-PERS-11, DO Records, [redacted], Box 19, [no folder listed], CIA ARC. See also various notes on Koenig in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 10, and DO Records, [redacted], Box 2, Folder 2, CIA ARC. (S)

As the Nazis shut down the legal movement of Jews from Germany and Austria,

underground organizations aided the Jews to escape. Funded by outside groups, including the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (commonly called the "Joint" or the JDC), the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the Political Section of the Jewish Agency, and the *Aliyah Bet*, Jewish agents penetrated the Third Reich both to rescue the refugees and to collect intelligence during the war. These personnel later formed the basis for the *Brichah* in numerous European countries during 1945-46.¹⁴ According to Koenig, "the various British Intelligence Services freely used the emissaries of this section [i.e. the Jewish Agency] for penetration, intelligence and DA [double agent] purposes. The representatives of the AIDC acted as a liaison with the

¹³ SCIA, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

¹⁴ The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was formed in 1914 to help Palestinian Jews suffering under the Ottoman Empire during World War I. During the Second World War, the Joint, under Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz worked with Shaul Meyerov (later known as Shaul Avigur), the head of the clandestine *ha-Mossad le-Aliyah Bet*, to smuggle Jews from Europe to Palestine. In 1939, after the publication of the White Paper, the *Haganah*, and the *Histadrut*, the General Foundation of Jewish Labor, formed the *Aliyah Bet* (interchangeably called the *Mossad*) to resist the British control of Jewish immigration. The Joint raised its funds from American Jews to finance the escape movement. The Joint and the *Aliyah Bet* worked with the Jewish Agency to establish their main posts in Lisbon, Marseilles, Istanbul, and later in Paris. As early as 1939, *Aliyah Bet* agents were in contact with Adolf Eichmann, the SS officer in charge of "Jewish Affairs" in an unsuccessful attempt to arrange the release of some 1,000 Jews from Austria. In 1944, Saly Mayer, the Joint's representative in Switzerland, provided funds to "buy" the release of over 1,500 Jews from Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Other rescue missions, including that of Raoul Wallenberg, were the results of efforts by the Joint and *Aliyah Bet*. (U)

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either by legal or illegal means, became an important weapon in the Jewish resistance against the British in Palestine.⁴ (U)

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visualized SYMPHONY as having several immediate and long-term goals, both of an overt and covert nature:

- Immediate Aims (overt): To extract information of CI value from refugees escaping from Russian-occupied countries; composition, trends and activities of the Communist parties in those countries; location and identification of concentration camps in Russia and Russian-dominated countries; identification of NKVD deserters or NKGB deserters; identification of NKVD agents or Communist agents sent among the refugees; identification and elimination of Nazi elements, infiltrating amongst the refugees to escape punishment from the authorities of their respective countries.
- Immediate Aims (covert): To ascertain and locate the agents of the Jewish Agency in Austria who run both the emigration of Jews from Russian-dominated countries and a highly-efficient intelligence service into those countries; to ascertain and spot those persons who smuggle Jews out of those countries for high sums of money and who, being in contact with NKVD officials, also smuggle war criminals and agents into the Allied-occupied zones, to work either in Austria or in Palestine.
- Immediate Aims (covert): To locate those persons within official organizations, such as the Hungarian Red Cross, the Austrian Red Cross, the Italian Red Cross, some so-called repatriation committees with official and semi-official status, the UNRRA and the (Lublin) Polish repatriation committees, who provide false papers and identification cards to those smugglers and to the smuggled for the furtherance of this traffic; to take all measures of security safeguard to eliminate or neutralize such traffic when it becomes a danger to the security of the Allied-occupied zones or to its establishments and units.
- Long-Range Aims: To penetrate those organizations of whatever kind they are—Jewish, political or of intelligence nature of any country—which send Russian-

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Allied intelligence services and eventually financed this courier-cum-intelligence service.¹⁵ (S)

In effect, Koenig saw the project, which he dubbed SYMPHONY, as a continuation of earlier wartime collaboration between the Allies and the Jews, and this time facing a new threat—the Soviet Union.¹⁶ In his proposal to Headquarters, Koenig

¹⁵SCIA, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S), in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. Some 240 Palestinian Jews volunteered to parachute into the Balkans in 1943 and the British established training camps in Cairo and Haifa. The following year, 32 men and women were, in fact, dispatched in joint British-*Aliyah Bet* missions into Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, Austria, and Yugoslavia. The Nazis captured 12 of the Jewish agents and executed seven, including poet Hannah Szenes. The most successful of the Palestinian agents, Yesheyahu Trachtenberg, better known as Shaikhe Dan, had a remarkable wartime and postwar intelligence career and is remembered as the savior of thousands of Romanian Jews. (U)

¹⁶Despite opposition from the British who wanted to restrict American intelligence operations, OSS had a sizeable wartime presence in the Near East Theater of Operations (NETO). With its headquarters in Cairo and smaller bases in Greece and Turkey, OSS personnel and agents were scattered throughout the region. Three branches of OSS—Research and Analysis, Secret Intelligence, and X-2—had a total of six agents in Palestine reporting on both Jewish and Arab perspectives as well as ties to the Jewish Agency and its missions into Central Europe. In August 1944, OSS agreed to accept reports from the Jewish Agency, but refused to exchange American intelligence or even acknowledge the Jewish reporting. By the spring of 1945, OSS in Washington severed its contacts with the Jewish Agency. With the end of the war, the strength of the NETO mission quickly dropped. From 80 personnel in October 1945, SSU counted only 38 by the following spring. Likewise, the new organization had retained only one agent in Palestine, an American missionary. Late in 1945, SSU acquired Capt. Nicholas Andronovitch, who had been the Army G-2's Military Liaison Officer in Jerusalem, as its representative in Palestine. Andronovitch provided a steady stream of reports as the British Mandate became increasingly volatile. Both the State Department and the Army commended him for his work when he finally returned to the United States in 1949. Born in Russia in 1907, Andronovitch fled after the Bolshevik Revolution with his mother and sister to Turkey. He entered the United States from Cuba in 1930 and became an American citizen nine years later. He joined the US Army as an officer in 1943 and rose to lieutenant colonel. [redacted]

[redacted] For further information on OSS and SSU activities in Palestine, see *War Report of the OSS: The Overseas Targets*, Vol. 2. Introduction by Kermit Roosevelt (New York: Walker and Company, 1976), p. 47. [redacted] [redacted] Clandestine Services Historical Paper [redacted]

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Hospital. Pier screened the refugees for information desired by the Jewish Agency and then prepared to move them to other DP camps in the American zone. Those refugees intended for Palestine were placed in a camp near Salzburg while those who could not or did not want to go to the Middle East were sent to other camps in Germany. Koenig calculated that Pier was responsible for the smuggling of hundreds, if not thousands, of Jews on a monthly basis into Austria and eventually toward Italy and Palestine.¹⁹ (S)

At first, Koenig posed as a journalist seeking information about the *Brichah*. As his questions became more of an intelligence nature, Koenig admitted to Pier that he was an American intelligence officer.²⁰ In the meantime, Koenig also wanted to place American personnel in the Jewish camps in Vienna, principally the Rothschild Hospital and the Jewish Agency's interrogation center on *Alserbacherstrasse*. These agents, also posing as American journalists, would collect intelligence on Soviet order of battle as well as economic and political information behind the Iron Curtain. US contact with the

¹⁹Ibid. In addition to Pier's covert smuggling mission, Koenig discovered numerous illegal rackets in Austria. The representative of the Free Polish intelligence service in Salzburg also used the Joint to bring people out of Poland, while Koenig later reported that members of the French Mission in Budapest were also involved in a smuggling ring. Koenig also described a Hungarian Jew, named Alfred Schwartz, who had set up his own group, the "Jewish Repatriation Committee for Hungarian Deported Slave Workers and Concentration Camp Inmates," which essentially became a black market ring in Vienna. Koenig stated, "there is no doubt that the Russian intelligence services are using this flow of Jews to infiltrate Jewish or non-Jewish agents into the Allied zones." More sinister, Koenig uncovered the smuggling of Hungarian non-Jews, many with Nazi collaborationist backgrounds, from Budapest to Vienna. In some cases, the operator of this network, Gabor Salzer, circumcised the Nazi escapees so as to pass them as Jews for migration to Palestine with the connivance of the Soviets. For further details, see SCIA, Vienna, "Jewish Emigration Racket Run by French Mission, Budapest," 19 April 1946, LVX-220, (S); SCIA, Vienna, "Szak Ladislav, Agent for Political Police, Hungarian State Police," 1 May 1946, LVX-226, (S); SCIA, Vienna, "Jewish Emigration Racket Run by Alfred Schwartz," 18 April 1946, LVX-219, (S); SCIA, Vienna, "Jewish Clandestine Emigration under Salzer," 18 April 1946, LVX-217, (S); and SCIA, Vienna, "Death of Salzer," 18 April 1946, LVX-218, (S), all in DO Records, [] Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

²⁰SAINT, Austria to SAINT, "Project SYMPHONY: Direct Overt Contact with Political Department, Jewish Agency," 10 May 1946, LSX-251, (S), in DO Records, [] Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. (S)

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CONDUCTOR (U)

Capt. Koenig also outlined the structure of the Jewish refugee groups in Austria and the various international organizations that supported the immigrants as they passed through the country. In particular, Koenig commented on the role of a young Austrian-born Jew, Arthur Pier, who represented the Jewish Agency in Vienna, but actually served as the head of the *Brichah* in Austria. Pier, according to Koenig, claimed to represent several Jewish newspapers, including the Palestinian Telegraphic Agency. "Officially Pier is here to collect items of Jewish interest for his newspaper employer, principally items on atrocities against Jews during the war and after," the American intelligence officer wrote. "Actually he runs a highly efficient intelligence net, through couriers into Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. He is also running another net," Koenig reported, "which tracks down Germans either free or in captivity in Allied-occupied zones of Germany or Austria, who are suspected or proven to have been committing atrocities against Jews during the war." Pier then turned these war criminals over to the Allies while he also collected evidence for the Jewish Agency.¹⁸ (S)

Pier's operational activities in Eastern Europe were of more immediate interest to Koenig than his Nazi-hunting skills. Koenig told Headquarters that Pier was the key link to facilitating the movement of Jews from the Russian-dominated countries, and he gave him the operational codename of CONDUCTOR. After organizing the Jews into small groups, Pier's agents led them surreptitiously across the border into Austria. The groups made their way to Vienna where the Joint initially placed them in the city's Rothschild

¹⁸Ibid. (S)

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Jewish Agency, Koenig believed, would expand SSU's understanding of the personalities involved in the illicit smuggling of refugees. This aspect of the project, however, proved the most difficult given the lack of Americans who could speak Yiddish or Hebrew. Lastly, Koenig hoped to infiltrate a Jewish agent into the refugee pipeline to assess the extent of the Soviet penetration of this movement.²¹ (S)

CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001.pdf

⁵⁰Acting Chief, FBM and DH-136 [believed to be Evelyn M. Williams] to Commanding Officer, War Department SSU Mission to Austria, "SYMPHONY Project," 19 September 1946, (S), enclosing Project Review, in DO Records, [redacted], Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. This same document is found in DO Records, [redacted], Box 1, Folder 11, CIA ARC. (S)

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suggested, in Vienna. Likewise, Headquarters also learned to its dismay that Capt. Koenig had himself been affiliated with the Jewish Agency prior to his joining the Army.⁵¹ (S)

For his part, Pier operated in a conspiratorial manner while the *Brichah* "has been more and more associated with, if not actually sponsoring, certain terroristic groups in a desperate effort to attain its aims." Pier's own methods, as seen by Washington, were

CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001.pdf

51 Ibid. (S)

52 Ibid. (S)

53 Ibid. (S)


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(‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 8)

https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA%20AND%20NAZI%20WAR%20CRIM.%20AND%20COL.%20CHAP.%2011-21%2C%20DRAFT%20WORKING%20PAPER_0001.pdf

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784A.13/7-3150 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET PRIORITY

TEL AVIV, July 31, 1950—11 a. m.

61. Importance of Prime Minister's disclosure reported below will I hope excuse my accidental violation of Department's standing instructions re my actions in Jerusalem to escape Tel Aviv heat and attend Bach concert, I was in Jerusalem July 28-30. Being informed Prime Minister was in Elath, Mrs. McDonald and I had tea his residence with Mrs. Ben-Gurion where to my complete surprise Prime Minister joined us.

He talked to me privately an hour substantially as follows:

Eban is returning Washington with instructions sound out desirability of visit of Prime Minister to US this fall to discuss "on highest level" possibility of USG sponsoring three years program to increase Israeli population through intensified refugee immigration to two millions and build with American arms effective Israeli army of 250,000 men "capable and anxious aid US and UK and Turkey to resist Russian aggression".